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Abstract 
This study adopts a bank production function approach to the measurement of 
banking efficiency at the provincial level in the Chinese state-owned commercial 
banking sector from 1998 to 2003. Applying Data Envelopment Analysis and 
efficiency decomposition analysis, this paper has revealed a significant level of pure 
technical input inefficiency and, to a lesser extent, scale inefficiency across the 
provincial branches of all the banking groups. The study has also uncovered the extent 
of inefficiency in individual banking inputs and provincial branches. Finally, the 
provincial-level efficiency is further decomposed into within-banking-group and 
between-banking-group effects. 
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1. Background of the study 
Over the past two decades, rapid advances in globalisation and financial 
integration, technological progress, and demographic changes have created significant 
new challenges and opportunities for national economies. In such a fast-evolving 
global competitive environment, banking and financial services play a vital role in 
helping the economy and society respond effectively to generate the liquidity, 
flexibility and dynamism that are required to meet the challenges and take full 
advantage of any opportunities. As China’s economy keeps growing at a spectacular 
speed and also becomes ever more closely integrated into the world economy, the 
Chinese banking and financial sector has received increasingly careful scrutiny by 
both Chinese domestic and foreign analysts and policymakers. In recognition of the 
vital role of modern banking and financial intermediary services, since the inception 
of China’s “open-door” policy in 1979 the Chinese government has been constantly 
pushing for a gradual but ever wider and further-reaching banking reform programme. 
A major plank of the reform programme is to improve the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the big four Chinese state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), as 
the SOCBs still play a dominant role in funding economic growth, supporting 
economic reform and maintaining social stability in China (Liu, 2004). 
Despite the substantial difficulty in obtaining adequate and reliable data on 
Chinese banking1, a growing body of empirical research has shed light on various 
aspects of the effectiveness of this reform programme in recent years (e.g., Li, et al., 
2001; Chen, et. al., 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2007, 2008; Lin and Zhang, 2008). The 
literature to date has focused on the financial performance of the banking groups as a 
whole (Li, et al., 2001) and how the performance relates to the asset structure and 
ownership of individual banking groups as well as the structure of the Chinese 
banking market (Chen, et. al., 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2007, 2008; Lin and Zhang, 
2008). What has generally emerged from these studies is that, compared with banks of 
other ownership types, such as domestic joint-stock, foreign-domestic joint stock, 
domestic private and foreign ownership, the SOCBs are heavily burdened with 
problems of bad loans, low efficiencies and poor financial performance. Despite the 
huge effort put into the reform programme for nearly three decades, there is so far 
limited improvement in the relative inefficiency or underperformance of the SOCBs. 
It might be argued that if the Chinese SOCBs operated in a genuinely competitive 
market environment, they would perhaps have gone out of business a few years ago. It 
then becomes even more puzzling that the recent floatation of three of the four 
Chinese SOCBs received unprecedented levels of enthusiasm from both Chinese 
domestic and international investors. Various explanations might be offered that are 
based on the irrationality or rationality hypothesis of investors’ behaviour, but it is 
also likely that the true nature and state of the competitiveness of the SOCBs are still 
not properly measured and understood. A sound assessment of the competitiveness 
                                                        
1
 Such difficulties include very limited disclosure of financial information due to lack of regulatory 
requirement, inconsistent accounting standards across banking groups and misreporting of information 
even in official data sources (see a detailed discussion in Li, et al., 2001).  
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and performance of the Chinese SOCBs in the broad context of the special 
characteristics and structure of the Chinese economy compounded by the forces of 
globalisation remains a challenge for analysts and policymakers. 
A comprehensive assessment of such issues is beyond the remit of the current 
study. The purpose of this study is to focus on one core aspect of competitiveness of 
Chinese SOCBs – their operational efficiency within each banking group. In contrast 
to the existing studies that treat the four state-owned banking groups as four 
decision-making units (DMUs) alongside other banking groups of different ownership 
structures, this study focuses exclusively on the big four SOCBs and treats their 
provincial branches as individual DMUs2. There are several reasons for doing this. 
First of all, the SOCBs differ substantially from other types of banks in terms of scale 
of operation, governance and market conditions. Whilst the SOCBs have branch 
networks across the entire country and their business operations are subject to severe 
policy interventions and protection, many other types of banks (e.g. joint-stock or 
private) only operate within very specific locations and under highly competitive 
market conditions. Since the efficiency measures of individual banks are relative to 
the most efficient peers that are selected in the sample, the measures are very sensitive 
towards the selection of samples. It is little wonder that due to different samples being 
selected, as well as differences in the variables and estimation methods adopted, the 
empirical measures of efficiency of Chinese banks differ substantially. For example, 
in a study on the cost x-efficiencies of the SOCBs and other types of banks in the 
1990s by Chen, et al. (2005), the SOCBs were found to be more x-efficient than the 
joint-stock banks, contradicting the results in Fu and Heffernan (2007, 2008). By 
restricting the samples to the SOCBs in the current study, the results may be more 
comparable and convincing. Second, by treating the provincial branches of the 
SOCBs as DMUs, the present study has overcome a statistical problem common 
among all the existing studies that arises from the small number of DMUs selected 
and hence a lack of degree of freedom. 
In light of the market conditions and data limitations, this study adopts a bank 
production function approach in the spirit of Baltensperger (1980), Santomero (1984) 
and Berger and Humphrey (1997) to examine the efficiency of the Chinese SOCBs 
over the period 1998-20033. Applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
decomposition analysis, this paper conducts a thorough investigation into the 
technical input efficiencies of the Chinese SOCBs at the provincial level. Although 
the DEA technique has been employed in various existing studies of banking 
efficiency in China, the present study extends the empirical work in a number of ways. 
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 Each of the four banking group has hundreds or thousands of branches in each of the thirty-one 
provinces, autonomous regions and directly administered municipalities on Mainland China. As 
detailed data are only available at the provincial/municipal level, each province or municipality under a 
banking group is treated as a DMU and the term “provincial branch” here refers to all the branches of a 
particular group within a particular province. Therefore, there should be 124 DMUs. But due to data 
omissions in official publications, the actual number of DMUs in this study is 122. 
3
 2003 is the latest year for which there is a full set of data for conducting the present DEA analysis. 
4 
 
First, for the first time this study examines banking efficiency of the SOCBs at the 
provincial level and almost all the provincial branches for the big four banking groups, 
viz. China Construction Bank (CCB), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Bank of China (BOC) have been 
included. Using the DEA technique, the present study has obtained values for total 
input efficiency, pure technical efficiency, scale efficiency and returns-to-scale 
characteristic for all provincial branches of the SOCBs. As data on banking costs, 
revenues and profit is generally unavailable at the provincial level due to 
confidentiality reasons4, such analysis provides an informed judgement on the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the SOCBs using data that is more accurate and 
more readily available. The empirical findings also reveal valuable information for 
judging the scale economy, unit cost of production and thus potential profitability of 
the banking groups. Second, the total input efficiency of each provincial branch is 
decomposed into the product of within-banking-group and between-banking-group 
efficiencies to separate the efficiency arising from within the provinces from the 
efficiency arising from the banking group as a whole. The rationale for such a 
decompositional analysis is that due to historical and political reasons, individual 
banking groups may be particularly advantaged or disadvantaged relative to the other 
groups. It is useful to empirically find out whether or not and to what extent this 
hypothesis is true. Moreover, the within-group versus between-group decomposition 
analysis can reveal the effectiveness of the banking reform programmes at the micro 
(province/branch) level as compared with the efforts at the mezzo (group/market) 
level. In short, the empirical results can enable policymakers and the management of 
SOCBs to target specific operational areas for further efficiency improvement. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly maps out the key 
milestones of the Chinese banking reform programme concerning the SOCBs since 
1979 and depicts their recent positions in the Chinese economy. Section 3 highlights 
the relevant market conditions and conceptualises the business model of the SOCBs 
for the period under investigation. This section also critically questions the 
monopolistic competition model that is commonly adopted by existing studies. It is 
worth pointing out that although the empirical analysis covers the period from 1998 to 
2003, the qualitative discussion will cover some more recent developments in the 
Chinese banking sector where partial empirical evidence is available. Section 4 
implements the empirical DEA and decomposition analyses. The major findings are 
presented and discussed in Section 5. The final section offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Stages of reforming the Chinese SOCBs 
As the Chinese banking reform programme concerning the whole sector has been 
extensively discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Li, et al., 2001; Chen, et. al., 2005; Fu 
and Heffernan, 2007, 2008; Lin and Zhang, 2008), this section only attempts to map 
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 Although such data exist for the whole banking groups, there is a significant extent of distortion to 
the data arising from government interference, as is discussed in more detail in a later section. 
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out the key milestones in the reform process concerning the state-owned banks. 
Broadly speaking, the reform process can be divided into the following four key 
stages. 
1) Separation of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) from commercial banking 
and establishment of specialised state-owned banks (1979 – 1993). Before 
1979, China’s economy operated under a central planning system and the 
PBC played the dual role of being both the Central Bank and the commercial 
bank. As a matter of fact, the PBC was not functioning as a normal banking 
institution but rather as an auxiliary resource allocation mechanism in a 
central-planning economy. The amounts and destinations of bank loans as 
well as the interest rates were all determined by the State Planning 
Commission together with the central fiscal and monetary authorities 
(Ministry of Finance and the PBC). As a major plank of the market-oriented 
economic reform programmes that started in 1979, the Chinese government 
began to reform and restructure the banking system. The focus of the early 
stage of the banking reform was on the establishment of the PBC exclusively 
as the central bank, together with the establishment of state-owned specialised 
banks and the acceptance of entry by foreign banks from 1979. The 
specialised banks, including the Industrial and Commercial Bank (ICBC), 
China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China (BOC) and Agriculture Bank 
of China (ABC), were set up from 1979 to 1984 to serve the specific needs 
that arose from the implementation of the Chinese government economic 
plans in designated economic sectors.  
2) Commercialisation of the big four state-owned specialised banks (1994 – 
1998). In order to separate policy needs from commercial considerations 
within the state-owned specialised banks, several policy-oriented banks such 
as China Development Bank, the Export-import Bank of China and 
Agricultural Development Bank of China were set up under the direct control 
of the State Council in 1994. The restriction on each banking group to operate 
in designated areas of business was also removed. 
3) Management of assets and especially non-performing loans of the SOCBs 
(1998 – 2002). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, since the SOCBs were 
obliged to lend almost exclusively to the inefficient state-owned non-financial 
sectors, a significant amount of bad loans had accumulated. Towards the end 
of the 1990s, the official estimate of the proportion of bad loans among the 
SOCBs was over 25%, although unofficial estimates put it at much higher 
figures. So a pressing agenda for the subsequent reform programme was to 
make the SOCBs commercially viable. Apart from an initial injection of 27 
billion Yuan (around US$3.3 billion) into the capital base of the SOCBs, the 
Chinese government also set up four asset management companies (AMCs) in 
1999 specifically to resolve the huge amount of non-performing loans of the 
SOCBs. The AMCs took over about 1.4 trillion Yuan (equivalent to US$170 
billion at the exchange rate of 1999) of non-performing loans (NPLs), which 
amounted to 15.6% of the total assets of the four banks. Each AMC had a 
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charter for ten years and was supposed to recover as many of the NPLs as 
possible through debt-to-equity swap, bankruptcy arrangement proceedings 
and debt-restructuring. Nevertheless, the official figure for the proportion of 
non-performing loans among the SOCBs still stood at 25% at the end of 
20025.  
4) Partial flotation and strategic alliance with foreign financial institutions (since 
2003). With China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, the Chinese government’s 
effort to reform the banking and financial services also accelerated. Another 
significant step taken by the government to make the SOCBs commercially 
viable was to recapitalise them before listing them on the stock markets. Over 
the period 2004 - 2005, the Chinese government injected US$60 billion of 
foreign exchange reserves into the capital of BOC, CCB and ICBC before 
these banks were successfully listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 
2005 and 2006. The floatation of these banks attracted unprecedented level of 
interests, including interest from foreign financial institutions that were eager 
to enter the potentially lucrative Chinese banking market. Legions of 
well-known international banking and financial institutions, having gained 
incremental access to the market since China's admission to the World Trade 
Organization, are buying minority stakes in Chinese banks (and other Chinese 
financial institutions) as well as expanding their limited branch networks in 
the country. Currently, restructuring of ABC is underway and it is likely to be 
floated in the near future.  
 
At the same time as establishing state-owned market-oriented commercial banks, 
the Chinese government has also gradually opened up the Chinese banking market to 
competition from banks of alternative ownership structure, such as private banks, 
domestic joint-stock banks formed by local governments and corporations, 
domestic-foreign joint-stock banks, and foreign banking and financial institutions. 
Currently there are twelve national shareholding banks, more than 100 city 
commercial banks, and tens of thousands of urban and rural credit unions. The latter 
types of banks compete aggressively with the SOCBs in the household retail banking 
market as well as the business banking market for the non-state-owned and local 
collectively-owned industries and businesses, particularly the fast growing, highly 
efficient and profitable small- to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It is no surprise 
that the SOCBs have been steadily losing market share over recent years. For example, 
the SOCBs’ shares of total banking assets, loans and deposits were 84.9%, 84.3% and 
88.5% respectively in 1998. By 2005 these shares dropped to 56.1%, 50.1% and 
79.9%. In the same period, the assets of joint-stock commercial banks trebled and 
their market share increased from 13% to 15%.  
Despite the relative decline, due to their vast banking infrastructure as well as 
political and historical reasons, the SOCBs still dominate the retail banking market 
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 Unless stated otherwise, all the figures in this study are derived by the authors from the data 
contained in the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking. 
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and the business banking market for the state-owned enterprises. In 2005, the SOCBs 
accounted for a market share of 63% of consumer deposits and 70% of consumer 
loans. On the corporate side, the SOCBs shared 75% of the deposits and about 70% of 
corporate loans in 2005. As China’s bond and equity markets are still at the nascent 
stage, the SOCBs remain the most important source of finance for Chinese 
non-financial institutions (see Table 1 below) and the largest employers of banking 
employees (56% in 2005). 
 
Table 1: Source of finance for China's domestic economy (%) 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
(first half) 
Bank loans 75.9 80.2 85.1 82.9 78.1 86.8 
Government bonds 15.7 14.4 10 10.8 9.5 1.4 
Corporate bonds 0.9 1.4 1 1.1 6.4 6.1 
Equity issuance 7.6 4 3.9 5.2 6 5.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
HSource: Hansakul (2006). 
 
More recently, the main thrust of banking reform has been directed at the 
competitive capabilities and efficiency within individual banking groups of the 
SOCBs. Significant amounts of resources and efforts have been deployed to increase 
their business scope, improve banking and financial services, strengthen the internal 
management and risk control systems, and increase operational autonomy. Since 2002 
the SOCBs have gained more autonomy in deciding their deposit and lending rates. 
Moreover, apart from the traditional wholesale and retail banking businesses, the 
Chinese SOCBs have also adopted the universal banking model to venture into other 
fee-based or capital-gains-based banking and financial investment activities (apart 
from investing in the stock market). Due to the increasing complexity and risk of 
modern banking, the SOCBs have implemented measures to instil an independent 
credit culture and equip their credit managers with modern systems to monitor various 
elements of risks. These include the 10-plus loan classification system and plans to set 
up the internal rating-based loan systems (consistent with Basle II regulations). The 
risk function has been separated from the business function. Internal audit and 
compliance systems have also been strengthened to safeguard against fraud through 
system upgrading and staff training6. At the operational level, the SOCBs have 
implemented changes to consolidate operations and increase efficiency. During 
2002-2005 the number of branches of the big four has declined by 27% while the 
number of employees has declined by 7%. How successful such efforts are in 
improving banking efficiency and competitiveness within individual banking groups 
remains an open question and is the key task of the current study. 
 
3. Current market conditions and business model of the Chinese SOCBs 
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 Source: various issues of the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking. 
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Given the dominant positions of the SOCBs and the market-oriented reforms for 
nearly three decades, it is perhaps not surprising that existing studies of the Chinese 
banking sector have typically assumed the SOCBs to be profit maximisers under a 
monopolistically competitive market structure (see, e.g., Fu and Heffernan, 2007, 
2008). In a standard monopolistically competitive model, the firms have complete 
discretion over the design and launch of their products, the prices to charge, the 
markets to compete in, and the price and non-price aspects to compete against or 
collude with their rivals. However, in the Chinese SOCB sector during the study 
period, such conditions were far from reality. Although the Chinese SOCBs had come 
a long way to be commercially viable, they were still severely restricted to function 
independently as profit maximisers, largely due to historical reasons and policy 
interventions. The SOCBs were, and are still, closely monitored and regulated in their 
corporate governance, deposit-taking and lending decisions and the deposit-lending 
interest spread. Their flow of funds was largely allocated on a geographical and 
sectorial formula basis and they had little control over their cost bases. As a legacy of 
the historical administrative division of business scopes coupled with the very nature 
of banking that is based on information, reputation, trust and network between the 
bank and the clients, the SOCBs and the colossal state-owned industrial sectors are 
inextricably linked to maintain stability in national output and particularly 
employment. In a sense, the SOCBs were still playing the role of the “treasurer” for 
the state-owned corporations. Therefore, the Chinese government always stands ready 
to rescue any failing SOCBs through capital injections and taking-over of bad assets7.  
The business model of the SOCBs was also shaped by the stage of China’s 
economic development in general and banking development in particular. Compared 
with established foreign banks, the Chinese domestic banks, particularly the SOCBs, 
have many disadvantages. Although the basic structure of a modern banking system is 
in place, the management of specific business areas such as credit and risk remains 
primitive. Despite a significant rise in the capital adequacy ratio achieved by capital 
injection by the government, stripping off bad assets, and stock market floatation, the 
formation and accumulation of bad assets still haunt the SOCBs disproportionally as a 
result of the ties with the state-owned enterprises. The rapid development of the stock 
markets and venture capital markets in China pose an increasing challenge to the 
banking sector’s traditional sources of commercial income and thus the profit model. 
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 The SOCBs’ defence against market risk is not always or exclusively policy intervention. One further 
buffer for the SOCBs to withstand the problem of significant proportion of NPLs is the very high 
liquidity level in the economy that arises from impressive economic growth at an annual rate of 8-10% 
for nearly two decades and also a culture of high savings ratio by Chinese households. In the past 
decade, the annual average growth rate in total banking assets, deposits and lending is almost twice the 
growth rate in real GDP. The ratio of banking assets to GDP in China increased from 151.8% in 2000 to 
245.2% in 2005, suggesting a very high level of liquidity in the Chinese economy that is very similar to 
the level in the Euro area (see also Fu and Heffernan, 2007). This high level of liquidity has enabled the 
SOCBs to spread the burden of NPLs over a rapidly expanding asset base and over a longer time 
horizon. 
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The new fee-based or capital-gains-based businesses also face tough challenges as 
China has little history or culture of paying for banking and financial services. If the 
SOCBs were to move rapidly to a pure profit-based market model, it would entail 
significant levels of unemployment in the SOCB sector itself and probably a credit 
crunch for the state-owned enterprises – an economic as well as political risk too high 
for the Chinese government to bear. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the most appropriate conceptual framework for 
describing the conduct of SOCBs is the principal-agent theory. A full development of 
the principal-agent model of the conduct of the Chinese SOCBs is beyond the scope 
of the current study. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the institutional framework 
and economic conditions in general and the market conditions in the banking sector in 
particular were prone to the occurrence of the principal-agent problem in the Chinese 
banking market. A possible solution to the problem is for the agents (managers of the 
SOCBs) and the principal (the government) to share the growth dividend arising from 
the continuing rapid growth of the Chinese economy. With the government readily 
willing to act as the ultimate insurer and underwriter, each SOCB’s objective is to 
maximise its market power that is manifested through their market share of deposits, 
loans and the size and quality of the client base. In other words, the competition 
among the SOCBs mainly took the form of non-price competition. In the meantime, 
the principal (the government) maintains control through a number of mechanisms 
including direct involvement in the corporate governance and control of the cost base 
to influence productivity, efficiency and profitability of the SOCBs. 
This characterisation of the behaviour of the SOCBs is consistent with empirical 
observation. As is already mentioned above, the growth in banking assets, deposits 
and loans has been spectacular in recent years across all the SOCBs, but the growth in 
the more market-oriented and riskier businesses has been rather limited. Although the 
business scope of the SOCBs is expanding, the traditional banking businesses still 
remain the dominant source of commercial income for the SOCBs (see Table 2). 
Non-interest income accounted for only around 10% of total income for the Chinese 
SOCBs (with the only exception of ABC that recorded a 26% share of non-interest 
income in 2005), compared with roughly 48% for the global banking market. 
Therefore, the traditional market for deposits and loans still remain the main 
battleground for the SOCBs. 
Further evidence to show that the SOCBs are unlikely to behave as profit 
maximisers comes from the usual measures of financial performance for business 
firms. As Table 3 reveals, the usual measures of financial performance such as ROA 
and ROE for the SOCBs are simply unreliable and subject to huge swings over time. 
This is simply because the business operations of the SOCs were subject to frequent 
government interference such as asset-stripping and capital injections. Thus, all the 
data on costs, income and profits are substantially distorted market outcomes (see 
Table 3). 
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 Table 2: Share of interest earnings in total operating revenue 
  CCB ICBC ABC BOC 
1998 98.3% 76.8% 94.8% 72.5% 
1999 95.8% 75.5% 94.8% 73.9% 
2000 75.7% 77.4% 91.8% 92.6% 
2001 90.0% 69.8% 88.8% 90.0% 
2002 94.6% 95.4% 87.9% 79.9% 
2003 92.7% 93.7% 85.8% 79.9% 
2004 92.2% 83.0% 80.8% 83.9% 
2005 93.5% 81.8% 73.7% 87.6% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from various issues of the Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking. 
 
Table 3: Return on assets and return on equity for the Chinese SOCBs 
 CCB ICBC ABC BOC 
ROA:     
1998 0.06% 0.11% -0.05% 0.10% 
1999 0.23% 0.12% -0.02% 0.11% 
2000 0.07% 0.13% 0.01% 0.07% 
2001 0.10% 0.14% 0.05% 0.10% 
2002 0.14% 0.13% 0.10% 0.33% 
2003 0.01% 0.04% 0.06% 0.15% 
2004 1.25% 0.60% 0.05% 0.60% 
2005 1.03% 0.53% 0.02% 0.70% 
ROE:     
1998 1.08% 1.88% -0.68% 1.69% 
1999 4.64% 2.27% -0.26% 1.98% 
2000 1.63% 2.72% 0.22% 1.17% 
2001 2.20% 3.09% 0.87% 1.21% 
2002 4.01% 3.47% 2.13% 4.33% 
2003 0.22% 1.24% 1.39% 2.46% 
2004 25.08% -5.60% 2.57% 10.22% 
2005 16.37% 13.30% 1.31% 11.76% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from various issues of the Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking. 
 
As a summary, given the market conditions under which the SOCBs operated 
(and are still operating, though to a lesser extent), it is natural for the SOCBs to 
behave in such a way as to maximise their market share, but the government closely 
monitor and influence the level of productivity and efficiency of the banks. How 
successful the individual banks perform in the traditional markets for deposits and 
loans fundamentally determine their overall competitiveness and financial 
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performance, particularly during the time period under investigation. It is also 
questionable to make direct comparisons of the financial or efficiency performance 
between SOCBs and other domestic banks or foreign banks (as in Li, et. al, 2001; and 
Lin and Zhang, 2008), since these banks operated under distinctly different market 
models. A model of banking efficiency and competitiveness of the SOCBs must take 
these aspects into consideration. This is the conceptual basis for the DEA model that 
is used for assessing the efficiency level of the SOCBs, as the next section explains in 
detail.  
 
4. Banking efficiency and DEA  
Despite many caveats that are associated with the definition and its empirical 
measures, it is widely held that productivity (or productive efficiency) lies at the heart 
of the competitiveness of firms and industries.8 As the measurement of productivity 
necessitates the measurement of inputs into and outputs from a production process, 
the application of the concept in banking requires the appropriate definition of the 
mode of production for banking and financial services in the national economy and 
the measurement of banking inputs and outputs. However, serious controversies 
surround the treatment of banking and financial services as well as the measures of 
banking and financial output in national accounts and the economics literature (see 
Triplett, 1990; Fixler and Zieschang, 1991; and Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Triplett 
and Bosworth, 2004). The controversy stems from the ways in which banking and 
financial services derive their main sources of income: by applying differential 
interest rate to borrowers and lenders to obtain net interest income and by explicitly 
charging fees for the provision of certain services. Because banks do not charge fees 
for many services they offer to their customers, the service charges are usually 
insufficient to cover non-interest costs of operation (e.g., wages, rents and materials). 
Thus banks and financial institutions typically rely on interest income to cover all the 
operating costs. However, opinions differ on how interest income should be treated in 
the measurement of banking output and value added. 
Traditionally interest is viewed by national accounts statisticians as a transfer 
payment from borrowers to lenders for the foregone consumption. On this view, 
interest payments are not considered to be payments for a service rendered, but a form 
of property income, and so are recorded in the generation of primary income account, 
but not the production account. This treatment inevitably means that the operating 
surplus of banks would show as a negative item. As this would give a false impression 
of the size of the operating surplus of banks compared with other firms, the original 
system of national accounts (SNA) adopted a somewhat peculiar solution. On the one 
hand, net interest income, alongside other banking services that are explicitly charged 
for, was counted as part of banking net output. On the other hand, total net interest 
income was deducted from the total operating surplus for all the other industries so 
that the calculation of national GDP remained unaffected (the net interest income was 
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 For an excellent review of the literature regarding productivity, see the work by Carlaw and Lipsey 
(2003). 
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not allocated to particular industries or final users though). Alternatively, in the bank 
production function approach to banking output and productivity (see the discussion 
in Baltensperger, 1980; Santomero, 1984; and Berger and Humphrey, 1997), interest 
is viewed as a payment for services that banks and financial institutions provide to the 
economy (payments services, money creation, management of liquidity and risk), to 
depositors (record-keeping, safe-keeping, and interest payments on deposits) or to 
borrowers (funding and credit rating). In this view, apart from the explicitly priced 
banking services, banking output also includes gross interest earnings from bank loans 
as well as imputed charges for depositor services that banks offer to their customers 
free of charge. Although there is little difference in the measured net banking output 
or value added between the above two approaches, the difference in the measured 
total banking output is substantial with the economists’ measure being significantly 
higher than the national statisticians’ measure.  
More recently, an eclectic approach has been adopted by economists and national 
accountants to incorporate the contribution by banking and finance to the national 
product through a statistical term called Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly 
Measured (FISIM). In essence, the method assumes that FISIM is purchased 
implicitly by borrowers paying higher interest than would be necessary if FISIM were 
charged for explicitly and by lenders receiving lower interest than would be necessary 
if FISIM were charged for explicitly. FISIM is then allocated to sectors and industries 
so as to identify the purchase of these services explicitly and to classify them as 
intermediate consumption, final consumption expenditure or exports according to 
which sector incurs the expenditure. The implication of the implementation of FISIM 
is far-reaching – not only banking output, in both net and gross terms, but also the 
output and value added for both the aggregate economy and the other industrial 
sectors will all be altered. A simple example here can help to illustrate the issues more 
clearly. Let L, D, RL, RD and I denote the volume of loan, deposit, the bank lending 
rate, the deposit rate and the net interest income. In the conventional national accounts 
treatment, the net interest income is defined to be I = RL L – RD D. In the FISIM 
framework, there will be a reference interest rate that represents the pure charge for 
the financial intermediary services that the banks provide to both depositors and 
borrowers. Let RF denote this reference rate (which lies between the deposit and 
lending rates), then the new level of net interest income is IF = (RF – RD) D + (RL – RF) 
L = I + RF (D – L). Since D > L, the new measure of bank net output is larger than the 
old measure by the amount RF (D – L), which represents the amount of pure charges 
for financial intermediary services offered by the banks. It is worth noting that such 
charges are shared by both depositors and borrowers, hence their income, expenditure 
and net output have to be adjusted accordingly. However, how the reference rate is 
determined is still highly controversial (see further discussion in Triplett and 
Bosworth, 2004). 
Corresponding to such controversies, it is little wonder that despite the substantial 
number of studies on banking output and productivity, there is still no coherent 
definition of either banking inputs or outputs. In the economic literature, the selection 
and classification of banking inputs and outputs have been guided by three general 
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models of banking and are also constrained by data availability in practice. The three 
general models are “financial intermediation”, “production function” and the “hybrid” 
model. The financial intermediation model is consistent with the traditional national 
accounts view that any interest-related banking activity is non-productive and the 
primary role of banks is to offer financial intermediation between depositors and 
borrowers. In this model, banks use the traditional factors of production (e.g. labour 
and capital) together with deposits as inputs to produce outputs of loans and other 
fee-based services (e.g. Sealey and Lindley, 1977). In the production function 
approach, banks are treated essentially the same as any other non-financial firm – they 
employ the traditional factors of production, viz. labour and capital, to produce a 
range of banking and financial outputs, including deposits, loans and other services 
(see, e.g., Benston and Smith, 1976; Berg, et. al., 1991; Berg, et. al., 1993; Berger and 
Humphrey, 1991). More recently, a number of researchers have proposed hybrid 
models that focus on the efficiency of banks in reducing costs or generating 
revenue/profit (e.g., Hancook, 1985; Berger, et. al., 1993; Berger and Mester, 1997, 
2003). In contrast to the earlier two approaches that focus on banking assets and 
liabilities in measuring technical and scale efficiencies, this third approach focuses on 
costs and earnings in measuring X-efficiency. Moreover, the classification of inputs 
and outputs in the hybrid model is also flexible – a financial product can be classified 
either as an input or an output, depending on whether or not the product makes a 
negative or positive net contribution to bank revenue. Due to severe problems with 
data availability and reliability in the current context, as discussed earlier, a hybrid 
model cannot be implemented within this study and thus is not discussed any further. 
Insofar as the financial intermediation and the production function approaches are 
concerned, the fundamental difference between the two is whether or not bank 
liabilities should be treated as inputs or outputs. It is nonetheless increasingly 
recognised that banks, like many other non-financial firms, use scarce economic 
resources to produce a range of banking outputs, including outputs that are offered 
free-of-charge mainly to depositors. Such outputs include free cheques cashed, 
automatic teller machine (ATM) transactions, and other transactions services. 
Although there is no explicit charge for using such services, depositors do pay for 
these services in the form of interest that depositors forego. Banks accordingly earn 
implicit revenue from these depositor services. At the same time, banks incur costs for 
producing the services, in the form of the resources employed in cheque clearing, 
ATM operations and other transactions services provided to deposit holders. In the 
spirit of Benston and Smith (1976), what a bank produces facilitates both 
inter-temporal and intra-temporal transfers of consumption, which corresponds to 
demands for both deposits and loans. Therefore, in principle a model of bank 
production and output needs to incorporate both deposit-related and lending-related 
services as well as other explicitly charged services. In the context of the Chinese 
SOCBs, there is an additional incentive for the banking groups to compete for 
deposits in order to support the burden of NPLs that arise largely from lendings to the 
state-owned enterprises. It is no wonder that the amount of deposits that a branch 
attracts features prominently in the criteria against which the performance of the 
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branch is judged by the management. Although a rigorous approach must take the 
measurement of every element of banking outputs seriously, such an approach is still 
eluding analysts. Therefore, the present study will adopt the production function 
approach but employ proxy measures for deposit-related, lending-related and other 
outputs. Such proxy measures are also widely used in the literature (e.g. see Berger, et 
al. 1993; Humphrey, 1993; Mester 1997).  
Following the literature, the current study uses the number of employees and the 
number of bank branches as inputs and the total amount of deposits and loans (in 
RMB Yuan) as outputs. Moreover, the present study also uses the number of cash 
cards as an input and the amount of card transactions as an output. Since the issuance 
and maintenance of cards incur additional capital and technology related costs and the 
average amount of card transactions per card can reflect the cardholders’ average 
spending power, this practice can capture the efficiency of the branches in attracting 
wealthy individuals who also have demands for other fee-based banking products and 
services such as personal asset management.  
Having clarified the selection of inputs and outputs, the next step is to specify the 
method for measuring the efficiency of bank branches in transforming inputs into a 
variety of outputs. Since there are multiple inputs and outputs in the present case, the 
natural tool of analysis is the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis that was 
originally developed by Charnes et al. (1978). DEA is ideally suited for benchmarking 
the relative operational efficiency of business units (termed decision making units, or 
DMUs) against their most efficient peers under similar market conditions and 
business models when multiple inputs and outputs are involved in the production 
process. The analysis indicates the necessary changes in individual inputs and outputs 
of a particular DMU so that the performance of the unit becomes as efficient as its 
most efficient peers. This method, now routinely adopted in a broad range of 
application areas, has been applied extensively in the banking and financial service 
sector. Conditional upon the appropriate choice of inputs and outputs as well as the 
sample of DMUs, the kind of mathematical programming procedure used by DEA for 
efficient frontier estimation is found to be comparatively robust (Seiford and Thrall, 
1990). Further evidence of the robustness of DEA as compared with other similar 
estimation methods is presented in Bauer et al. (1998).  
The present study focuses on the technical input efficiency of the provincial 
branches of the SOCBs, that is, the maximum proportional contraction in any 
observed input that can be achieved if all inputs by a branch contract radially as far as 
possible without detriment to its output levels (Thanassoulis, 2001, p.24). The focus 
on input efficiency is consistent with real world developments in the Chinese banking 
sector that was characterised by limited scope for further growth in deposits and loans 
for the SOCBs due to severe competition from other banks that were expanding 
rapidly. The estimation of the technical input efficiency is performed under alternative 
assumptions about the returns to scale characteristic in the production process. 
Following the original model of Charnes, et al. (1978), which has become widely 
known as the CCR model, the overall technical input efficiency (termed θCCR) of each 
branch is estimated under the assumption of constant returns to scale. The CCR model 
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is also extended to obtain the slacks in inputs and outputs by a two-stage estimation 
procedure (see, Cooper, et. al., 2002). Let j denote the jth DMU (or bank branch, j = 
1, …, N), xi the ith input (i = 1, …, M), and yk the kth output (k = 1, …, S), SXi the 
slack in the ith input, and SYk the slack in the kth output. In the first stage, for any 
particular DMU (denoted by j0) the following linear programming problem is solved 
to obtain its efficiency score (i.e. θj0CCR): 
 
Minimise: θj0 
 
Subject to: 
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θj0CCR = θj0* where θj0* is the optimal value of θj0. 
 
In the second stage, the optimal value θj0* is used in the following linear 
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If θj0* = 1 and SXi = 0 (i = 1,…,M), SYk = 0 (k = 1,…,S), the operation of DMU j0 
is defined to be Pareto-efficient, otherwise it is Pareto-inefficient and the extent of 
technical inefficiency is measured by 1- θj0*. One limitation of the above model, 
however, is that all the DMUs, regardless of their size, are assumed to be operating 
under constant returns to scale, which is a very restrictive assumption. Banker et al. 
(1984) modified the CCR model to allow for the DMUs to operate under variable 
returns to scale (and the modified model is termed the BCC model). The modification 
is rather straightforward: the following convexity constraint is introduced into the 
CCR model: 1=∑ jλ . The resultant efficiency score for DMU j0 is now termed the 
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pure technical input efficiency (denoted by θj0BCC). On the basis of the two efficiency 
scores, the scale-efficiency score for DMU j0 (denoted by θj0S) can be obtained as: 
BCC
j
CCR
j
S
j 000 / θθθ = . Moreover, using the optimal values for λ (denoted by λ*), the 
returns-to-scale characteristic of DMU j0 can also be determined as follows: 1) If 
1* >∑ jλ for all the optimal solutions to the CCR model, then decreasing returns to 
scale (DRS) hold locally for DMU j0; 2) If 1* =∑ jλ for at least one optimal solution 
to the CCR model, then constant returns to scale (CRS) hold locally for DMU j0; 3) If 
1* <∑ jλ for all the optimal solutions to the CCR model, then increasing returns to 
scale (IRS) hold locally for DMU j0. The optimal scale size is at where CRS holds. 
Given the absence of any data on bank profit at the provincial level, such information 
is valuable in identifying the potential unit cost of production and thus profitability of 
the branches.  
In the above procedures, all the branches of all the banking groups are pooled 
together to estimate a global efficient frontier against which every branch is compared. 
However, it is probable that for historical as well as political/administrative reasons, 
branches within a particular banking group may face a separate group efficient 
frontier from that for another banking group. In other words, irrespective of the 
efficiencies at the provincial level, a banking group may be intrinsically more 
effective than the other groups in improving the operational efficiencies of all its 
branches across the provinces. This is particularly pertinent in the Chinese SOCBs as 
historically these banking groups were severely restricted in the economic sectors 
within which they could operate. As a result, the level of efficiency of individual 
banking groups may be related to the conditions and performance of those economic 
sectors. Moreover, over different time periods different banking groups received 
policy priority treatments by the Chinese government, which again may have led to 
differences in efficiency performance at the group level. Therefore, similar to the 
procedure developed by Charnes et al. (1981), this study decomposes the technical 
efficiency score for a provincial branch into the product of within-banking-group 
efficiency and between-banking-group efficiency. For convenience such efficiencies 
are termed local efficiency and group efficiency respectively in subsequent discussions.  
Local efficiency is obtained by estimating the technical input efficiency of all the 
provincial branches within the same banking group in the first-step estimations. In the 
second step, the observed input-output levels of all the branches for all the banking 
groups are replaced by their targeted optimal levels that are calculated from the 
first-step estimations. All the branches with the new optimal input-output levels are 
then pooled together to estimate the efficiency score for the branches again. Since in 
the second step, the inefficiencies at the local level have already been removed by the 
use of optimal inputs and outputs, any new inefficiency must be due to the group 
effect. The next section implements the estimation procedures discussed above and 
presents the main findings. 
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5. Data and results  
All the data for the present study are obtained from the Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking9 (1998-2003 issues). The full dataset contains all the defined 
inputs and outputs from 1998 to 2003 for the branches of the four banking groups in 
31 provinces, autonomous regions and provincial-level municipalities on mainland 
China (with the exception of Tibet which has partial data), giving rise to a sample size 
of 122 provincial level DMUs for each year. The following table presents the relative 
share of the inputs and outputs by each banking group as a whole.  
 
Table 4: Share of inputs and outputs by banking groups (2003, %) 
 Branch Employee Card Deposit Loan Card Transaction 
CCB 18.8  24.2  33.5  23.7  22.7  30.6  
ICBC 27.3  27.5  21.5  37.6  37.4  15.7  
ABC 40.8  36.1  31.3  23.9  25.0  50.7  
BOC 13.1  12.1  13.8  14.8  14.9  2.9  
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Clearly, ABC has the most extensive banking infrastructure among the four 
SOCBs, with the largest share in the number of branches and employees and second 
largest share in the number of cards issued. It also has a significant share of all the 
outputs, with more than half of the market in card transactions. Compared with ICBC, 
ABC’s relatively smaller shares in deposits and loans were mainly due to the 
historical and administrative reasons that the operations of ABC were largely 
restricted to the agricultural sectors and the rural areas whilst ICBC was traditionally 
the dominant player in the state-owned industrial and commercial sectors. However, 
over the recent years, ABC was very aggressive in venturing into new business areas 
such as bank card related businesses. BOC has the smallest market share in either 
inputs or outputs. This is largely due to the fact that it was primarily dealing with 
banking businesses involving foreign currencies and thus accessible to a small 
proportion of domestic individuals and firms. Of course, there are significant 
variations in market shares of inputs and outputs across all the provinces. By 
estimating the CCR and BCC models the technical input efficiency scores as well as 
the decomposed pure technical and scale efficiency scores for all the provincial 
branches are obtained. Table 5 shows the average efficiency scores for the banking 
groups from 1998 to 200310. 
                                                        
9
 It should be pointed out that the term “bank cards” refers to different measures for the four banking 
groups at the provincial level in the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking: for ABC, CCB and 
ICBC, the term contains both cash cards and credit cards, whilst for BOC only credit cards are counted. 
Therefore, the card-related inputs and outputs for BOC had to be adjusted to be consistent with the 
figures for the other three groups using a variety of sources including statistical year books for 
individual provinces. 
10
 All the DEA models were implemented in the GAMS modelling system developed by GAMS 
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Table 5: Group average input efficiencies of the Chinese SOCBs (1998 – 
2003) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Technical:             
All 0.53 0.49 0.51 0.59 0.53 0.61 
CCB 0.48 0.40 0.47 0.54 0.62 0.54 
ICBC 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.64 0.62 0.74 
ABC 0.58 0.50 0.52 0.62 0.40 0.56 
BOC 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.46 0.63 
Pure:             
All 0.59 0.55 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.64 
CCB 0.52 0.43 0.50 0.55 0.65 0.55 
ICBC 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.67 0.66 0.75 
ABC 0.69 0.61 0.59 0.64 0.44 0.59 
BOC 0.68 0.66 0.62 0.62 0.52 0.66 
Scale:             
All 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.96 0.93 0.96 
CCB 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.95 0.97 
ICBC 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.98 
ABC 0.87 0.84 0.89 0.97 0.92 0.95 
BOC 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.95 
Note: due to rounding errors, figures for technical efficiencies do not exactly equal the products of pure 
technical and scale efficiencies in the table. 
 
For the Chinese SOCBs as a whole, there was clear evidence of significant levels 
of operational inefficiency as compared with the most efficient provincial branches – 
the average score was 53% in 1998 and then fluctuated between 49% and 59% until it 
improved to 61% in 2003. The generally low level of efficiency was primarily due to 
the low pure technical efficiency, which was 59% in 1998 and 64% in 2003. The low 
pure technical efficiencies were reflected in the loss of efficiency for all the inputs. At 
the start of the study period, compared with the efficient targets, around 57% of 
branches, 49% of employees and 49% of cards for the whole sector could have been 
cut to achieve the same or even higher level of outputs. In 2003, despite the 
significant reductions in the number of branches and employees over the years of 
further reform, the percentage of wastage was still 42% for branches, 45% for 
employees and 39% for cards. Therefore, the cost-cutting measures by the banking 
groups did have the desired effects, but the effects were only partial and the process of 
reform was very slow. These results are consistent with the gradualist approach to 
economic and banking reform adopted by the Chinese government to avoid 
potentially large scale unemployment and credit crunch problems that could arise 
from a “shock-therapeutic” approach. Some other benefits of the reform started to be 
evident at the end of the period. For example, the pure technical efficiency started to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Development Corporation. 
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improve for the whole sector in 2003, and the average scale efficiency increased 
steadily from 0.9 in 1998 to 0.96 in 2003. 
Having briefly examined the overall efficiency performance of the whole SOCB 
sector, the focus now turns to the performance of individual banking groups. As Table 
5 shows, BOC was the clear leader in operational efficiency in the first half of the 
period but its leading position was taken over by ICBC in the second half. The 
performance of ICBC in the second period was particularly noticeable as this group 
was the worst performer in the first three years. The other groups showed a mixed 
fortune over the period. CCB had the lowest score for 3 out of the 6 years and was at 
the bottom of the league table in 2003. ABC came second in the table in the first four 
years but its position dropped to the bottom in 2002 and second from the bottom in 
2003. More detailed results regarding various aspects of the operational efficiencies 
are reported in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Operational efficiencies of individual groups of the SOCBs 
(1998-2003) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
No. of Pareto-efficient provinces:       
   CCB 3 2 3 4 4 4 
   ICBC 2 1 1 2 5 5 
   ABC 3 2 2 3 1 2 
   BOC 6 6 5 4 2 4 
No. of branches operating at CRS:       
   CCB 3 2 3 4 4 4 
   ICBC 2 1 1 2 5 5 
   ABC 4 2 2 3 1 2 
   BOC 7 6 5 4 2 4 
No. of branches operating at IRS:       
   CCB 10 18 21 16 1 4 
   ICBC 11 10 11 5 2 16 
   ABC 6 8 8 3 5 7 
   BOC 15 18 17 19 12 22 
No. of branches operating at DRS:       
   CCB 18 11 7 11 26 23 
   ICBC 17 19 18 23 23 9 
   ABC 20 20 20 24 24 21 
   BOC 9 7 9 8 17 5 
% of target level - by no. of branches       
   CCB 46.9 38.3 45.9 53.4 56.7 52.9 
   ICBC 36.7 34.3 35.3 57.4 42.0 67.9 
   ABC 38.2 36.0 34.0 50.5 38.1 55.0 
   BOC 50.7 48.9 47.0 48.8 28.7 56.0 
% of target level - by no. of employees       
   CCB 41.9 36.3 42.7 43.7 59.4 47.0 
   ICBC 42.0 43.7 46.3 63.1 62.4 73.6 
   ABC 57.5 50.4 51.4 61.1 19.6 35.3 
   BOC 61.9 59.8 58.0 55.1 46.4 62.7 
% of target level - by no. of cards       
   CCB 44.5 35.9 45.5 53.5 61.9 53.0 
   ICBC 39.2 40.9 43.3 64.3 59.6 73.6 
   ABC 57.2 50.5 51.7 61.9 40.3 55.5 
   BOC 62.1 59.9 58.0 56.4 45.9 62.7 
Note: % of target level is expressed as the ratio between the level of an input that a DMU would require 
were it operating as efficiently as its most efficient peer and the actual level of that input. Thus, 1 minus 
this figure can be regarded as the percentage of wastage in that input. 
 
A number of significant results have emerged. First, among the 122 provincial 
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branches, just over 10% operated at an efficient scale (13% in 1998 and 12% in 2003). 
Around half of branches operated at decreasing-returns-to-scale (52% in 1998 and 
48% in 2003), suggesting that these branches were operating at a scale that is above 
the most productive level. Given the dominance of interest income in banks’ total 
revenue and the very limited autonomy by the banks to change their interest rates, it 
can be deduced that these branches were not operating at the profit-maximising scales 
and thus could benefit from a reduction in their scales of operation. The problem was 
particularly acute for CCB and ABC throughout the period. ICBC also experienced a 
significant problem of DRS in every year apart from 2003. In contrast, the most 
significant problem for BOC over the entire period was IRS, thus there was scope for 
many branches in this group to increase the scale of operation. Second, related to the 
problem of above-optimal operational scales, there was also a significant problem of 
surplus inputs of branches, employees and bank cards. Relatively speaking, ICBC had 
the least surpluses whilst CCB and ABC had the most surpluses in all the inputs. The 
problem of surplus labour was particularly severe for ABC. To shed further light on 
the areas where improvement is required, the decompositional analysis of local versus 
group efficiencies is conducted and the results are presented in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Local and group efficiencies of the SOCBs (1998 – 2003) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
SOCBs: 
   Local 
 
0.70 
 
0.73 
 
0.70 
 
0.68 
 
0.68 
 
0.68 
   Group 0.77 0.71 0.76 0.90 0.85 0.94 
CCB: 
   Local 
 
0.64 
 
0.66 
 
0.72 
 
0.61 
 
0.68 
 
0.54 
   Group 0.80 0.68 0.66 0.90 0.96 0.99 
ICBC: 
   Local 
 
0.79 
 
0.80 
 
0.77 
 
0.76 
 
0.69 
 
0.76 
   Group 0.53 0.56 0.61 0.86 0.92 1.00 
ABC: 
   Local 
 
0.75 
 
0.84 
 
0.73 
 
0.73 
 
0.71 
 
0.74 
   Group 0.74 0.60 0.77 0.85 0.66 0.78 
BOC: 
   Local 
 
0.63 
 
0.62 
 
0.61 
 
0.60 
 
0.64 
 
0.66 
   Group 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.98 
 
It is clear that for the whole sector of SOCBs, efficiency at the local provincial 
level declined but efficiency at the group level generally improved over the entire 
period. Moreover, efficiency at the group level dominated efficiency at the local level 
and the gap was rising in recent years, suggesting that in general the source of 
inefficiency was from the local level. Therefore, further efficiency gain can be 
obtained more effectively by targeting reform efforts at the micro/branch level than at 
the group level. Insofar as the individual banking groups are concerned, BOC was the 
most efficient at the group level. This is not really surprising given this group’s 
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significant exposure to international markets and foreign competition. Nevertheless, 
compared with the most efficient peers within the BOC group, the level of local 
efficiency was the lowest among the four banking groups. Again, this result was not 
really surprising as it is expected that those provinces in the interior parts of China 
were not as exposed to foreign-currency related businesses as their counterparts 
located in the east coastal provinces. In the remaining three groups, some interesting 
contrasts have emerged. Although ABC was not the worst performer in the first few 
years, it fared worst in the efficiency score by 2003. For CCB and ICBC, although 
these two groups compared unfavourably with the BOC in the first few years, they 
had become almost as efficient as BOC in 2002 and 2003. Therefore, ABC seemed to 
be particularly disadvantaged in its operational efficiency over the study period. At 
the local level, the level of inefficiency was very significant across all the banking 
groups, especially within the CCB group. 
Finally, the study presents the six-year average technical and scale efficiency 
scores for all the provincial branches of the Chinese SOCBs over the examination 
period. Not surprisingly, provinces on the eastern coast and the major cities were 
associated with much higher technical input efficiency scores than those provinces in 
the interior parts of China, although the difference in scale efficiency was rather 
limited. Therefore, the cross-province differences in technical input efficiency mainly 
arose from the differences in pure technical efficiency. The charts in the Appendix 
show the distribution of efficiency scores among all the provincial branches. 
Apparently, with the exception of 2001 and 2003, the peak of the distribution 
occurred at an efficiency level of less than 50%. By 2003, the provincial branches 
were more uniformly distributed across the efficiency range of 0.4 to 1, suggesting an 
across-the-board, albeit limited, efficiency improvement. 
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 Table 8: Average technical input efficiency of SOCBs across Chinese 
provinces and major cities (1998 – 2003) 
Provinces CCB ICBC ABC BOC 
Beijing 1.00  1.00  0.69  1.00  
Tianjin 0.66  0.53  0.51  0.73  
Hebei 0.36  0.50  0.57  0.51  
Shanxi 0.59  0.64  0.49  0.48  
Inner Mongolia 0.37  0.48  0.44  0.43  
Liaoning 0.54  0.64  0.47  0.72  
Jilin 0.41  0.72  0.37  0.79  
Heilongjiang 0.49  0.70  0.57  0.78  
Shanghai 0.95  0.89  0.87  1.00  
Jiangsu 0.39  0.65  0.48  0.50  
Zhejiang 0.63  0.48  0.51  0.42  
Anhui 0.30  0.42  0.43  0.43  
Fujian 0.78  0.70  0.85  0.45  
Jiangxi 0.51  0.61  0.42  0.39  
Shandong 0.44  0.63  0.44  0.44  
Henan 0.49  0.71  0.60  0.43  
Hubei 0.27  0.44  0.33  0.64  
Hunan 0.29  0.33  0.35  0.55  
Guangdong 0.44  0.64  0.39  0.71  
Guangxi 0.45  0.39  0.55  0.43  
Hainan 0.42  0.50  0.46  0.65  
Chongqing 0.54  0.34  0.39  0.47  
Sichuan 0.54  0.44  0.41  0.57  
Guizhou 0.32  0.29  0.54  0.47  
Yunnan 0.29  0.38  0.55  0.63  
Tibet 0.96  - - 0.89  
Shaanxi 0.42  0.57  0.55  0.43  
Gansu 0.55  0.54  0.67  0.69  
Qinghai 0.53  0.59  0.82  0.39  
Ningxia 0.43  0.41  0.75  0.47  
Xinjiang 0.38  0.48  0.46  0.38  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 Table 9: Average scale efficiency of SOCBs across Chinese provinces and 
major cities (1998 – 2003) 
Provinces CCB ICBC ABC BOC 
Beijing 1.00  1.00  0.99  1.00  
Tianjin 0.94  0.98  0.97  0.94  
Hebei 0.97  0.81  0.82  0.98  
Shanxi 0.97  0.94  0.94  0.97  
Inner Mongolia 0.98  0.97  0.97  0.97  
Liaoning 0.95  0.76  0.86  0.96  
Jilin 0.94  0.91  0.94  1.00  
Heilongjiang 0.96  0.83  0.83  1.00  
Shanghai 0.99  0.91  0.97  1.00  
Jiangsu 0.97  0.82  0.71  0.92  
Zhejiang 0.92  0.94  0.83  0.96  
Anhui 0.98  0.98  0.91  0.99  
Fujian 0.97  0.99  1.00  0.98  
Jiangxi 0.98  0.85  0.95  0.98  
Shandong 0.93  0.80  0.79  0.96  
Henan 0.83  0.84  0.76  0.99  
Hubei 0.97  0.87  0.83  0.91  
Hunan 0.95  0.97  0.97  0.98  
Guangdong 0.77  0.69  0.73  0.75  
Guangxi 0.99  0.99  0.99  0.98  
Hainan 0.98  0.97  0.99  0.99  
Chongqing 0.90  0.96  0.99  0.80  
Sichuan 0.98  0.94  0.86  1.00  
Guizhou 0.92  0.99  0.90  0.90  
Yunnan 0.94  0.99  0.96  0.95  
Tibet 0.98  - - 0.89  
Shaanxi 0.98  0.94  0.95  0.92  
Gansu 0.99  0.98  0.92  0.94  
Qinghai 0.99  0.96  0.94  0.56  
Ningxia 0.99  0.95  0.94  0.72  
Xinjiang 0.97  0.98  0.97  0.81  
 
6. Conclusions  
Given the significance of banking and finance in the modern economy and the still 
dominant position of the SOCBs in the Chinese banking sector, substantial resources 
and efforts have been deployed by the Chinese government to improve the level of 
efficiency and competitiveness of the SOCBs in recent years. How successful the 
efforts have turned out to be remains an open question. A combination of conceptual 
problems with a proper definition of the banking production process and the lack of 
consistent and reliable data for the Chinese SOCBs has made the empirical 
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assessment difficult to carry out. By adopting a banking production function approach, 
and using data on banking inputs and outputs that are relatively reliable, the present 
study focuses on the measurement of technical input efficiency and scale efficiency of 
the SOCBs at the provincial branch level. On the whole, the empirical results 
represent rather uncomfortable readings for the Chinese policymakers and 
management of the SOCBs. For the whole sector of SOCBs, the level of technical 
input efficiency remained very low throughout the study period, even though there 
was a small improvement in 2003. The technical input inefficiency was mainly due to 
pure technical inefficiency, but also to scale inefficiency. Despite the substantial 
reduction in the number of branches and employees over recent years, the problem of 
surplus branches and employees was still significant in 2003. A related problem was 
that around half of the provincial branches were operating at an above-optimal scale 
(larger than the most productive scale size), particularly among CCB, ICBC and ABC. 
In contrast, the most significant scale problem for the BOC group was increasing 
returns to scale (i.e. operating below the most productive scale size). Therefore, for 
the first three groups, further efforts should be directed at consolidating existing 
banking inputs (e.g. branches) further, whilst for BOC the main focus should be on 
further expanding banking outputs and new business opportunities. 
Looking at the sources of inefficiency from an administrative point of view, 
different patterns have emerged among the banking groups. For BOC, the inefficiency 
is almost entirely due to local inefficiency in the provinces whilst the group as a 
whole remained efficient throughout the study period. ICBC and CCB made 
significant improvements over the years and by 2003 were almost as efficient as BOC. 
Therefore, by the end of the study period, there was little difference in operational 
efficiency at the group level among CCB, ICBC and BOC. In contrast, the group level 
efficiency for ABC stayed low until the end of the study period. It seemed that the 
Chinese government’s efforts to prepare CCB, BOC and ICBC for stock market 
floatation in recent years had put ABC in a considerably disadvantaged position in 
terms of operational efficiency. It remains to be seen whether or not the on-going 
effort by the Chinese government to float ABC will bring its efficiency performance 
in line with the other three groups. Moreover, compared with the efficient provincial 
branches, the majority of the provincial branches were operating at a too low level of 
technical efficiency. A casual inspection of the empirical results reveals that the 
inefficient branches were mostly but not always located in the interior parts of China, 
suggesting a potential link to the state of economic and banking development in 
different provinces. However, a detailed explanation of the inter-provincial 
differences in banking efficiency is left as a future research agenda. 
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Appendix: Distribution of efficiency scores among provincial branches 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
